In 1861, a Nogai prince named Canpolat, who was expelled from the Caucasus during the ongoing Russo-Caucasian war and settled near Constanza, wrote to the Ottoman officials to complain about the -rebellious behavior‖ of his five slaves that he brought with him.
the story. The feud that started between the murderer and his victim was consequently carried over to the Ottoman lands, as was their -savage‖ ways. -Many accepted the Ottoman state's protection as it were the divine order,‖ Zohrab noted, but many others kept with their -nomadic and bellicose habits.‖
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Starting roughly about mid-nineteenth century, such criminal offences as murder, theft, raiding, pillaging or banditry and the conflicting Caucasian and Ottoman views on them, were addressed and dealt with in accordance with the (trans-)forming criminal law, -which could be anything but taken lightly‖ as Zohrab described it, and the legal institutions that adjudicated criminal cases. This transformation began with the introduction of the criminal code in 1840 and continued through late 1860s, generating a hybrid system, in which -crimes against the individual or his/her property were the first 7 placed more faith on such overtly secular institutions as the Ministry of Justice and the Parliament, than on the religious ones. 16 This article seeks to explore the jurisdictional conflicts that emerged at the juncture of the transplanted legalities that followed the Caucasian expulsion in the 1850s and 60s, the promulgation of the proto-constitution known as the Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856, and the internationally enforced trade ban in African slaves in 1857. Starting with the Caucasian expulsion, it traces how legal practices were carried over with Caucasian refugees to the Ottoman domains and how the judicial management of slaveryrelated conflicts determined not only the limits of slavery, but also how such liberal -fictions‖ as freedom or equality before the law were vernacularized by the local agents in the Ottoman Empire. Navigating within a set of what was labeled as hürriyet davaları (freedom suits), it looks at how enslaved refugees built their claims in relation to different legal terrains, problems and concepts, ultimately arguing that while Caucasian-Ottoman slavery was economically marginal, it posed serious challenges to the new political order the Ottomans aspired to establish and the abolition that never came continued to bend the categories of ethnicity, race and gender, contributing to the -violent turn‖ of events in the subsequent decades.
The Caucasian Expulsion and Transplanted Legalities
Not only the hardships, such as the diseases and destitution that the refugees encountered during their passage and settlement, but also a good amount of information from the profuseness of the languages they spoke to the strangeness of their customs appeared in journals and newspapers worldwide. Especially the British public, whose interest was shaped by strong anti-Russian sentiments, read a great deal about -the brave and hardy‖ people of the Caucasus, -finished by exile, fever, famine ague, and, far worse than all, cruelty.‖ 17 Besides the settlement and integration problems, difficulties arose in relation to the Ottoman government's policies that aimed to settle the refugees in strategic places, such as the border regions. The Ottoman government deemed it advantageous to populate its margins with the incoming Caucasians not only on the account of an outside threat (as was the case in Tuna province, in relation to Russia, for instance) but also for managing the native populations of the empire. 18 The highly fractured nature of the refugees (and the hostilities and feuds that they brought with them) nullified any possibility of forming a unified Caucasian community. 19 As the British consul in Soukoum-Kalé, Dickson, reported to Earl Russell in February 1864, -the absence of all political cohesion between the northern tribes, or such remnants thereof, and those inhabiting other parts of the Caucasus, and, indeed, the almost utter impossibility of bringing about such a consummation‖ was one of the major misfortunes that fell on the people of the Caucasus.
-Each and all cannot be made to forget their blood feuds,‖ Dickson noted, -still less to unite in a common cause...‖ 20 However, formidable addition to the empire's -Mahomedan population,‖ they proved useful in destabilizing existing structures of power and networks of influence, particularly the early groups of refugees who were reportedly armed. 21 This situation, which produced ample amount of tension between the refugees and local populations, caused frequent clashes across the Ottoman lands.
In some instances these hostilities and clashes were circumstantial, which were forced upon the refugees, as mentioned above, by the difficult conditions of refugee life households and 365 individuals was not to be mixed with the Tatars when settled in Dobruca (Dobrich for one, were instances in which the customary law was speedily transported into the Ottoman sharī'a and public law, by pushing the slaveholder to appeal to and demand from the legal and governmental institutions to set its coercive measures against their slaves' -rebellious‖ behavior. 38 Such was the case with Ömer, a slave owner from Şibu (possibly, Şabsu or Shapsug) tribe, for instance. When two male and three female slaves of his ran away to Rhodes island in 1860, he petitioned the office of the Grand Vizier, requesting the recovery of the runaway slaves. The Grand Vizierate, for its turn, found the case to be the matter of the sharī'a law and ordered that it be heard at the corresponding court and dealt with in accordance with the legal decision. 39 Many of the major conflicts reported by the slaves and slave owners directly resulted from an ambiguous notion of ownership rights over people that referred to both customary and sharī'a law at once. This situation rendered, in a nutshell, the implementation of these laws the very source of the problem itself.
The individual sale of family members and the breaking up of families produced violent resistance against the slave owners and caused closer appeal to the Ottoman government on the slaves' side. Markoval, 36 years old), his wife (35 years old) and their children (whose age ranged between 14 and 4 years), but met fierce resistance from the family, whose appeals stated that they would rather -bring themselves to ruin and perish‖ than seeing their family be broken, and themselves be removed from the remainder of their extended family and relatives. 40 Their appeal found support from the district governor of Yanbolu, who stated that selling those over thirty years of age and those who had children would be violating the notion of the family, and suggested that the sale should be halted. and acted, at times in an organized manner, to obtain or at least claim them. Starting early on with the emigration process, the enslaved refugees were highly vocal in demanding change to their status, at times acting -rebelliously,‖ and potentially, mutinously. In the aftermath of their expulsion from Russia, where, as they themselves put it, they -left all that they owned, except for their poverty,‖ the impoverished refugees were less likely to go into bloody conflicts within their community. Nevertheless, the instances of violent encounters did exist and both the possibility and fear of its frequency remained real. This time the police managed to control the situation and put an end to the skirmish, but the dispute which had caused it still remained unresolved. The slaves demanded to be freed, and the slave holders refused to manumit them. The governor reported that he had sent to the village one of his staff officers to mediate between the factions. He was concerned, however, that with 400
households of immigrants-all armed-fighting could be resumed at any time.
Therefore, the Vâli suggested that the villagers be disarmed, and he asked the Grand Vezir to authorize this move.
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The Ottoman government was not there solely to appease these tensions, however, nor to act as a judge to bring a mutual solution for the parties involved. It was there also to code the slaveholding and enslaved refugees' behavior and place them in the -grid of law‖ that it was weaving. Such was the case with Listan, Yunus, and Zekeriya, three of Makhar Ahmed's slaves, who took up rifles and shot at the latter's house one night. In their interrogation, they said that they did so not with the purpose of killing him, but rather to frighten him, so that he would forgo the cruel treatment and torture he applied to his slaves. 45 Just like slave flights, these offences sped up the process of legal assimilation of the enslaved refugees and often highlighted if not imposed a uniform meaning of their slave status. In the case of Listan, Yunus, and Zekeriya, for instance, their offence was brought to the local and eventually higher court of Supreme Council, determined to be a criminal offence punishable in accordance with the article 179 of the Ottoman Criminal Law that called for imprisonment for the duration of one week to six months. But since these three slaves (whose enslaved status was established with the very first question in their interrogation) committed the offence against their masters (efendi), their bold attempt was found to be an aggravating factor, and their sentence was determined to be imprisonment for the duration of a full year. Thus, by coding the enslaved refugees' act against their owners as such, the Ottoman government, and its law administering institution helped define these relationships as something above the ordinary and essentially unequal.
While, judging by the age composition, many of the slaves who were recorded in the settlement registers were inherited and could be claimed ancestrally, 46 the ancient law, -adat-ı kadime‖ was evoked not solely or necessarily to refer to ancestral rights to own slaves, whose enslavement took place during the tribes' long-gone days in the . Broken down into families of different sizes, each entry in the register began with a brief visual description (particularly of height and the shape and color of the beard), name and age of the head of the family followed by information on the remainder of the family members, starting with the wives and ending with the slaves that the family owned. 47 BOA, A.DVN 146/11, 1276.S.14 (12 September 1859). 48 As it would be reported many years later, in addition to those who came to the Ottoman Empire as slaves, many were enslaved en route to the Ottoman lands due to the harsh conditions of the journey that cost the lives of 200 to 300 people every day. 49 Especially in the aftermath of the constitutional revolution in 1908, during which slave claims to freedom virtually exploded, many stories of -unjust enslavement‖ during the Caucasian expulsion came to the fore, to undo slaveholders' claims to ancestral slave ownership.
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Ehud Toledano has argued that it was the penalties not being strong enough for kidnapping and enslavement that allowed the traffic to go on unhindered throughout the remainder of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet, this argument readily attributes universality to the newly adopted Ottoman criminal code, and the justice it promised. 51 The penal code was not there to be simply and universally adopted by everyone, including the incoming Caucasian refugees, whose justice system worked differently than both the sharī'a law that sought to maintain status quo above all, or the penal code that aimed to reach a universal justice at all costs. It was there to be negotiated, by those who were also negotiating their participation and inclusion to the but they did negotiate their understanding of the law, sovereignty, subjecthood and citizenship.
From the Ottoman government's point of view, law had to be negotiated differently with the slave holding and enslaved refugees also. The Ottoman Empire, like all vast land empires, was accustomed to rule its diverse populations by coopting its elites, thus the imperial law primarily concerned itself, as Jane Burbank has argued for the Russian Empire, by the -rights and obligations of the local elites.‖ 52 As Grattan
Geary, the editor of Times of India put it in 1878, there was great benefit to the Ottoman government in recognizing -the authority of the Circassian chiefs over their followers,‖ for they could, according to Geary, -keep their people in some sort of order if the government would empower them to do so:‖ As it is, the law is too feeble a restraint, and the patriarchal rule of the chiefs being set aside the wild Circassian does whatever he pleases. His great physical strength and his perfect mastery over his weapons, of which he always carries a varied assortment, make him the most formidable of all the robbers in these parts.
My experience was confined to those what had been taken into the Government service, and I found them to be very far the best in escort duty that I had on the whole journey. They were obliging, hearty, good-humored fellows never afraid of exertion or exposure and never inventing ingenious fictions as an excuse for coming to a premature halt. There is fine material in these Circassian settlers who have so unenviable reputation. Possibly in the reorganization of Asiatic Turkey, which cannot now be long delayed, they will be turned to good account.
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On the one hand, the Ottoman government had a lot at stake in empowering the slaveholding Caucasian elites, to be able to implement and enforce the law which otherwise would be -too feeble‖ to have any use at all. 54 On the other, however, endorsing the -kanun-i kadim‖ in perpetuating slavery, undermined the very law the Ottoman state wanted to implement. Scholars of Ottoman history have pointed out this dilemma, in which the Ottoman government was caught between its old habits of rule and the new political and legal order it aspired to build. 55 Most recently, Janet Klein's study of the Hamidian era efforts to include the Kurdish region -into the Ottoman fold,‖ and the government's extensive use and abuse of the local power networks (as much as the regional conflicts) offers a good example of this dilemma. However, Klein's (and others') studies rarely go beyond the interactions between the Ottoman government and local power holders. Accordingly, law as the tracing paper of power appears to be negotiated only between these bodies whereas other, less privileged groups also took part in these negotiations whenever they could. This was especially and transparently so in the case of post-Caucasian expulsion slavery in the Ottoman Empire. 
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into how slaves took part in these negotiations at a time when the legitimacy of slavery was highly contested and the world was increasingly more connected in ways subjecthood and citizenship, as well as the notion of justice and equality that it was hypothetically contingent upon, were understood. Here Abrek (as one man of trustable judgment) appeared alone in the provincial court, and yet not as a plaintiff either, but representing a joint effort against the adat-ı kadime, the slave-holding elite who claimed their ownership pertaining to that law, as well the Ottoman government, who was seeking to (re)define and enforce their status as slaves for the sake of public order and security.
These claims continued in the ensuing years and became more organized and collective in nature, producing actual petitions and lengthier arguments. In the meantime, however, both the slave owners and the Ottoman state developed their own (inter)related strategies and solutions. Convinced that manumitting slaves without the consent of their owners would bring on violent opposition and more clashes, the Council of Ministers suggested that self-purchase (mükâtebe) would be the best solution, 61 not only to appease the ongoing or future tensions but also to resolve the matter without deviating from the sharī'a law that governed all civil matters in the empire. Mükâtebe, an established sharī'a procedure, allowed the slaves and slave owners to mutually determine the payment terms and to set the amount (often the equivalent of the slaves' sale price) for manumission. Upon the completion of the full payment, the slave would be given a manumission certificate and deemed free, while the owners themselves would receive a fair amount of compensation at the same time. 62 One apparent problem with mükâtebe was that exceedingly impoverished enslaved refugees, who were mere sharecroppers on their owners' land, 63 were not able to pay a slave's price, let alone pay for an entire family. Moreover, legally speaking, it was a voluntary procedure and could not be imposed upon slave owners, which was, as Ehud Toledano observes, a setback for the slaves:
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A mükâtebe could not be imposed on a slave owner who had not flagrantly mistreated his slave; it also gave greater leverage to the Şerî courts, before which such procedures were normally being conducted. Apparently, the government was unable to overcome the strong opposition of the Circassian slave holders, or simply preferred to avoid a direct, and undoubtedly bitter, confrontation with them. The readiness with which the Şerî courts were issuing orders supporting the position of slave owners against the claim of their slaves put the government were meant to benefit the slaves. This may be indicative of a general mood in religious circles, one which upheld the legality of slavery because it was sanctioned by Islam. The government, it should be stressed, was consistently careful in emphasizing the slavery, as distinct form of the slave trade, was not to be interfered with. The Persian Gulf ferman of 1847, the prohibition of the Circassian and Georgian slave trade in 1854, and the ferman of 1857 against the traffic in blacks come to mind in this context. It was only the institution of agricultural slavery among the Circassians that Porte was trying to dismantle, and that too-in the face of strong opposition-it did gradually, with great caution, somewhat diffidently.
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That the Ottoman government appeared sympathetic to the cause and claims of the slaves, at least more so than the sharī'a courts, was not because it was inherently good-natured or benign. In fact, the Ottoman government too favored the slave owners over slaves under most circumstances, but it did so more subtly and with a different set of obligations and priorities, particularly at the international level, in comparison to the sharī'a courts, which were exceedingly and purposefully local. between the Ottoman and other governments including Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France, which gave the latter the right of search and seizure, as necessary. however, the root of the problem that afflicted them now had to do with the terminology rather than anything else: the word slave (köle) was understood only as those employed in domestic settings and sold at will (which in fact was incompatible with the adat-ı kadime, they clarified), but what they really ought to be called was peasants (reaya).
The petition clarified that this wrong usage of the word slave was devised by the slaveholding Caucasian elites themselves, who were accustomed to act as the sovereign in their native lands, which now was challenged by the Ottoman state. 83 Only by holding on to their slaves (and defining them as such, before all), the petitioners argued, the Caucasian elites could hold on to or assert their princely qualities that they believed they had and guarantee their gains through payments they extorted from their slaves or simply by selling them. 84 This situation of being at the service of both the Ottoman state and the Caucasian princes, which meant paying two separate taxes, was not only beyond the limit of their means but also impaired the authority of the Ottoman state itself. Moreover, their legal status as slaves exempted them from the military draft. While all other immigrants the Ottoman government opted for regulating and ameliorating the conditions of slavery, but eschewed an apparent intervention to achieve a wholesale abolition, even though it was aware of its undermining effects, which was discussed, -one by one, item by item‖ by the enslaved refugees in their claims to freedom. In fact, even the military draft was partially left to the slave owners' consent and will. The Council stated that those who were already in the process of mükâtebe could enter into army service, as a way of paying the self-purchase fee, but only with permission obtained from their owners. 87 In that, the Ottoman government undermined its power as the -holder of the sovereign decision,‖ by tying it to the consent of another authority. 88 All in all, the Ottoman government failed to bring about an effective solution, and instead continued with half measures, that benefited in most cases only the slave owners. 89 In other words, its justice betrayed the slaves who had the most faith in it. We know that these half measures as limitations and regulations were hardly enforced in the following decades also, as the Caucasian settlements continued to supply the urban and provincial elite households with women and young girls as slaves.
In fact, even the principal purpose of the Ottoman government's appeasement strategies failed, and the clashes between the slaves and slave owners continued in the ensuing years. A year after the Council's official communication, in 1873, a note written by the office of the Grand Vizier reported on the difficulties the slaves encountered in paying the self-purchase amounts that were previously decided on. The office suggested that the fee should be paid in kind, with whatever was left from the previous year's and half of the current year's crop. 91 The fee could also be paid in cash, by auctioning the crop, if the slaves preferred to do so. In almost an automated-sounding response, the Ottoman government reiterated that mükâtebe would protect and guarantee the sharī'a rights of both parties and help in doing away with the ongoing strife and for that reason, should be put into practice and the results be reported to the office of the Grand Vizier at once.
Just when the Grand Vizierate issued this decision, an incidence of unrest was communicated from Canik, where armed slaves and slave owners reportedly assembled in the town square. The report explicated that there too, a group of slave representatives had been to Istanbul in pursuit of legal action to undo or get rid of their slave status.
While there, the slaves and the slave owners came to an agreement on the implementation of mükâtebe for the manumission of the slaves, but the latter retreated from the agreement and could not be persuaded in its implementation, even though they were given detailed explanations on the benefits of the solution. The parties were eventually calmed down through the local government's intervention, but given that the matter was Judging by the sizeable number of slaves petitioning with similar claims in the aftermath of the 1908 revolution, we know that mükâtebe, which the Ottoman government insisted upon, was far from bringing on a general or wholesale abolitionary solution. As already discussed above, it was after all a voluntary agreement, one that was at the slave owners' discretion. In that, it even failed to provide the means to secure public order that the Ottoman government valued most. Consequently, the course of the
